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MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF ARGERSINGER:
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN
NORTH DAKOTA
To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay,
right or justice. .... No man shall be taken or imprisoned,
or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed;
nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
-MAGNA CARTA
Whenever an individual is confronted with prosecution for a
criminal offense, no matter how serious the penalty, he is at a great
disadvantage if not guided by the hand of counsel. When a person
enters the courtroom as a defendant, with the resources of the state
at work against him, he is unlikely to willingly forego the protection
afforded by a proper defense. Central to that defense is the presence
of an attorney. However, the barrier of poverty has placed the
assistance of counsel beyond the reach of a substantial minority
of Americans.
Over the years it has been the concern of courts in the United
States to rectify this imbalance. The recent decision of Argersinger
v. Hamlin,1 extending the right to counsel to indigent misdemean-
ants, provides an occasion to examine the development of this right,
its current federal status, the parallel development in North Dakota,
and a novel project to implement it.
It is the purpose of this note to focus on the regional Public
Defender project currently in operation in the Bismarck area; its
inception, its goals, its conduct, its effectiveness, and its future.
While some statistical comparisons will be made with jurisdictions
employing the assigned system for providing counsel, it is not the
purpose of this note to enter upon a detailed evaluation of the rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses of the public defender system vis-a-vis
the assigned system.
1. Argersinger v. Haminn. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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I. FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Constitutional law has experienced an expansion of the rights
of the accused in the past several decades with a concomitant
thrust toward insuring that the indigent2 is not denied the full
measure of his constitutional protections because of financial dis-
ability. The evolution of the rights of the criminal accused has been
inextricably bound up with the "right against self-incrimination"
clause of the Fifth Amendments and the "right to counsel" clause
of the Sixth Amendment,4  as incorporated and made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right of the accused to be effectively represented by counsel
has not been limited to the courtroom.6 While the initial attention
of the Supreme Court was focused on the representation to be afford-
ed an accused person at trial, first in the case of a crime involving
capital punishmentJ and later in all felony prosecutions8  and
juvenile proceedings; 9 the right of the accused to be represented
by counsel has subsequently been extended to include such pre-trial
stages as surreptitious interrogation of an indicted person, 10 of a
2. At the present time there is no widely accepted definition of "indigent." Standards
applied by various jurisdictions are flexible and contemplate consideration of a wide
range of factors. In regard to the determination of indigency with respect to right to
counsel, see generally Note, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel and Public
Defender Systems, 49 N.C. L. REv. 705 (1971); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Coun-
sel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. Rsv. 1054, 1073-74 (1963) ; Note. The
Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 579-80, (1963) ; Note, Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Study of
the Public Defender and Assigned Counsel System, 13 STAN. L. REv. 522, 545 (1961). In
North Dakota, in most cases of indigency is determined by a series of questions put to the
defendant or in the alternative a financial affidavit is requested prior to a determina-
tion that a need exists.
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capitol, or other-
wise infaxmous crime . . . nor shall be compelled In any Criminal Case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .. "
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United Staths and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. See Kamisar, The Rlght to Counsel and the 14th Amendment: A Dialogue on the
Most Persuasive Right of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. Riv. 1, 60-61 (1962). Kamisar posits
the idea that the services of a lawyer to his client might be of much greater value out-
side the courtroom than in it.
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
9. Tn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
1C. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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criminal suspect,"1 a suspect under custodial interrogation, 2 a de-
fendant appearing in an identification line-up, 3 and at preliminary
hearings. 14 A right to counsel has been found to exist on appeals
provided as a matter of right,1 5 and in the peno-correctional process-
es of probation revocations or deferred impositions of sentence.' 6
Justice Brennen clearly enunciated the applicable standards in
United States v. Wade,27
It is central to [the constitutional] principle that in ad-
dition to counsel at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he
need not stand alone against the State at any stage of pros-
ecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial. .. .
B. THE ROAD TO Argersinger
The Supreme Court initiated its extension of the right to counsel
to the indigent accused in state criminal prosecutions in Powell v.
Alabama.19 In reversing the conviction of a condemned rapist who
had not been represented at his trial, (although the entire local
bar of Scottsburo, Alabama, was ostensibly appointed to defend
Powell) the Court said, "The right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel. ' 20 Thirty years later the Court employed the same
rationale to overturn the conviction of a defendant sentenced to
five years in prison, whose request for the assistance of counsel
was denied in a felony prosecution for breaking and entering with
intent to commit a crime.2 1
In light of Powell and the broad statements made in Gideon,22
the way had been cleared2 under "conventional analogical analy-
11. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
14. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
15. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
16. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
17. United States V. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
18. Id. at 226.
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. Id. at 68-69.
21. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. Here the Court acknowledges that the right to counsel is fundamental to a per-
son "charged with a crime," id. at 343, and that the right extends to "all criminal prose-
cutions." Id. at 339.
23. The holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), applying the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to accused felons only in "special circumstances" has been specifi-
cally overruled by Gideon v. Walnwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). It has been suggested
that the Betts rule as applied in practice was tantamount to a rule requiring counsel in
cases involving felonies:
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SiS'" 2' to extend the right to representation by counsel to ijidigent
misdemeanants. Yet in the same manner that Powell became equat-
ed with requiring the appointment of counsel in capital cases,2 1
Gideon became equated with requiring the appointment of counsel
only in felony cases.26
In the immediate post-Gideon days, the extension of the right
to counsel in non-federal misdemeanor prosecutions seemed to be
both a logical and likely development. 27 The Supreme Court heigh-
tened this speculation with its per curiam decision in Patterson v.
Warden,2 8 vacating the petitioner's conviction on a misdemeanor
charge which carried a felony-length sentence. Although Gideon's
broad dictum provided ample foundation for making such an exten-
sion, the unrepresented misdemeanant was given scant consideration,
as the Court instead concentrated on expanding the rights of the
accused felon.2 9
Although the Supreme Court seemed reluctant to definitively
apply its Gideon rationale to accused misdemeanants, other federal
courts were willing to impose such a duty on the states, at least
to the extent that they were able to do so without more concrete
direction from the Supreme Court. In Harvey v. Mississippi"0 the
court was impelled to extend the right to counsel based on the impli-
cations that could be drawn from the Supreme Court's activity
in right-to-counsel decisions following Gideon.3' It was found that,
"such disadvantages [as lack of assistance of counsel] and conse-
In non-capital cases, the 'special circumstances' rule has continued to
exist in form while its substance has been substantially eroded. . . . [Tihere
have been not a few cases in which special circumstances were found in
little or nothing more than the 'complexity' of the legal questions presented,
although those questions were often of only routine difficulty. The Court
has come to recognize . . . that the mere existence of a serious criminal
charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of
counsel at trial.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
24. Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. R v. 685, 717
(1968).
25. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963), the Court said:
While the Court at the close of its Powell opinion did by its lan-
guage . . . limit its holding to the $articular facts and circumstances of that
case, Its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel
are unmistakeable.
26. In Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967), the Court stated that Gideon v.
Wainwright stood for the proposition that "there *was an absolute right to the appoint-
ment of counsel in felony cases."
27. Junker, supra note 24, at 687.
28. Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1962), rev'g Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194,
175 A.2d 746 (1961). Patterson was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon (a mis-
demeanor) and sentenced to a two year prison term. The Maryland Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction, holding that appointment of counsel was available only in "serious
cases."
29. See notes 7 to 17, supra.
30. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). Here the petitioner was con-
victed of the misdemeanor of "possession of whiskey," and sentenced to 90 days in Jail,
without being advised of his right to be represented by counsel.
31. Id. at 271. While the Harvey court ackknowledged the argument that such a right
was implicit in the holding of Gideon itself, it declined to make a decision on that basis.
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quences [as that of a guilty plea] may weigh as heavily on an
accused misdemeanant as on an accused felon."18 2 On its face,
it is not unreasonable to construe Gideon as incorporating the Sixth
Amendment to the same extent as the right to counsel is applicable
in federal prosecutions.- Quoting Evans v. Rives,3 4 the Harvey
court defined the Sixth Amendment requirement in the case of a
federal misdemeanor:
It is . . .suggested . . .that the constitutional guarantee
of the right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal case
does not apply except in the even of 'serious offenses.' No
such differentiation is made in the wording of the guarantee
itself, and we are cited no authority, and know of none, mak-
ing this distinction. The purpose of the guarantee is to give
assurance against deprivation of life or liberty except strictly
according to law. The petitioner would be as effectively de-
prived of his liberty by a sentence to a year in jail for the
crime of non-support of a minor child as by a sentence to
a year in jail for any other crime, however serious. And so
far as the right to the assistance of counsel is concerned, the
Constitution draws no distinction between loss of liberty for
a short period and such loss for a long one.3 5
The court, in McDonald v. Moore,36 relied on the Patterson-Harvey
line of cases in rejecting the "serious offense" rule,3 7 finding that
under Gideon the state must meet the same standard which is ap-
plied in federal prosecutions. 8
Whatever uncertainty surrounded the applicability of Gideon
to misdemeanor prosecutions was ended by the Supreme Court in
a series of decisions denying certiorari to misdemeanants convicted
in state courts without the benefit of an attorney.3 9 In Winters v.
Beck, 4 0 Justice Stewart dissented, saying that "no State should be
permitted to repudiate those words [the holding in Gideon v. Wain-
32. Id. at 269.
33. See Junker, supra note 24, at 688. The author draws the analogy that because the
defendant in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was convicted of a felony, no one has
suggested that the prohibition against unlawful search and seizures applied only to state
felony prosecutions. The author quotes Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967),
"There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth
Amendment between types of crimes . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment draws no lines be-
tween various substantive offenses." Id. at 688 n.23.
34. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
35. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263, 271 (5h Cir. 1965).
36. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
37. Id. at 110.
38. Id. at 108.
39. Heller v. Connecticut, 154 Conn. 743, 226 A.2d 521, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 902
(1967) ; Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1093, 397 S.W.2d 634, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966) ;
De Joseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert, denied, 385 U.S. 482 (1966).
40. Petitioner was convicted of "immorality" and sentenced to 9yA months in jail based
on his inability to pay a $254 fine. He neither asked for coutnsel nor was informed of any
right to counsel, nor was he informed of the nature of the charges against him, the pos-
sible consequences, nor of his right to examine witnesses.
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wright 1] by arbitrarily attaching the label 'misdemeanor' to a
criminal offense."42 Even the dissenting opinions cannot be char-
acterized as unequivocally supporting the expansion of the right to
counsel misdemeanants. DeJoseph v. ConnecticuV8 indicated that
the purpose of the dissent was not to advocate the result the Court
should have reached, but rather that the petition should be consid-
ered in order "to clarify the meaning of Gideon.""
The due process rationale applied in Gideon"5 proved ineffective
during the remainder of the 1960's as an answer to the question
of whether a misdemeanant had a constitutional right to counsel;
perhaps resolution of the issue was even more remote than when
Gideon was first handed down.4 6
It was speculated that the sweeping scope of the Court's equal
protection argument in Douglas v. California47 might well provide
impetus for extending the right to counsel to accused misdemean-
ants, 4 8 one authority stating:
Nor . . . does Douglas stop at discretionary review and
post-conviction proceedings. Indigent persons may find that
they also have been awarded absolute rights to assigned
counsel in justice courts, juvenile proceedings, probation re-
vocation, hearings-everywhere a rich man may appear with
counsel! 4 9
Despite such conjecture, when the expansion came to rank the
right of a misdemeanant to be represented by counsel" a decade
after Gideon v. Wainwright," the rationale was strictly founded in
the due process clause; indeed, Douglas was not even mentioned.
41. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42. Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 905, 908 (1966).
43. Petitioner was convicted of criminal non-support and sentenced to one year Im-
prisonment. Requests for counsel were rejected both at arraigment and trial because the
accused had failed to request a finding on his claim of indigency pursuant to the State's
procedural rules.
44. De Joseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
45. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
46. Junker, supra note 24, at, 715-16.
47. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
48. See Junker, supra note 24, at 693-95; Kamisar, The Right to Counsel in Minne-
sota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1963).
Indicative of the efficacy of the equal protection rationale, the Court In Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) ; and Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969), held
that where misdemeanor convictions were appealable, the state was required to furnish a
"record of sufficient completeness," 404 U.S. at 198, to allow full and effective review.
Speaking directly to the subject of misdemeanors, the Williams' court held that a state
cannot allow "unreasoned distinctions" to impede equal access to appellate courts, 395
U.S. at 459.
49. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field-Findings and Legal-Pol-
icy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1963).
50. Argerslnger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
51. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
NOTEs
C. Argersinger AND BEYOND
It was not until 1972 that the Court finally recognized the
right of the misdemeanant to be represented by counsel. In Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 2 the defendant was charged and convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor punishable by impris-
onment for six months and a $1,000 fine. Unrepresented at his trial,
Argersinger received a 90 day jail sentence. The appeal to the Su-
preme Court was on a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleging
that without the assistance of counsel he was unable to properly
"raise and present to the trial court good and sufficient defenses"
to the charge.5 3 In finding that the Constitution does not tolerate
distinctions between brief and substantial deprivations of liberty,
the Court held that:
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, mis-
demeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel
at his trial.54
In every relevant sense, the indigent misdemeanant is indis-
tinguishable from the indigent charged with a felony.5 5 This has
been accepted at the federal level as a truism for over 40 years,56
and is now applicable at the state level, ending the day when the
misdemeanor prosecution could be called the " 'Appalachia' of the
criminal justice system. ' 5 7 The Argersinger Court recognized that
the rationale in Powell and Gideon was relevant not only to felony
situations but to "all . . . criminal prosecutions"5 8 in which an ac-
cused is deprived of his liberty.5 In reaching its decision the Court
rejected the "petty offense" theory,6 0 holding that there is no
correlation between denying an accused counsel at his trial and the
constitutionally permissible occasions when a defendant may be tried
without a jury.61
52. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
53. Id. at 26.
54. Id. at 37.
55. Junker, supra note 24, at 686.
56. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1942).
57. Junker, supra note 24.
58 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972).
59. Id. at 32-33.
60. See generally Junker, supra note 24, at 704-08.
61. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972). The Florida Supreme Court
denied Argersinger's petition, relying on the rationale that because Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968), extended the right to Jury trials only to non-petty offenses
punishable by more than six months imprisonment, that the right of a misdemeanor to
counsel was similarly limited.
Mr. Justice Powell (concurring) disagrees on this point: "It is clear that wherever
the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an Indigent has a right
to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due process right to a jury trial."
Id. at 45-46.
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Argersinger raises several problem areas, which may be cate-
gorized as the imprisonment problem, the appointment problem,
the magnitude problem, and the non-enforcement problem.
In linking the right to counsel with an "imprisonment stand-
ard, 62 the majority opinion6 3 requires that this determination be
made by determining whether incarceration is in fact imposed, and
not on the mere possibility that it might be imposed. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in applying Argersinger, noted that the decision
"forbids imprisonment without representation . . . not trial without
representation. ' ' 64 It is on this point that Justice Powell in applying
his "fundamental fairness"65 approach disagrees:
When the deprivation of property rights and interests is
of sufficient consequence, denying the assistance of counsel
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a
denial of due process.66
This argument is reminiscent of Justice Clark's concurring opinion
in Gideon v. Wainwright,67 where he noted that, ". .. there cannot
constitutionally be a difference in the quality of process based
merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved."66 1
Such an approach is founded on the premise that conviction of
a crime may involve consequences which are at least as serious
as incarceration. 69 This advocated expansion of the right to counsel
remains for future determination, as the Argersinger majority saw
no need for resolving the question.70
A second major problem area centers around the degree of
judicial discretion to be employed in the appointment of counsel.
The Court outlines the responsibility of the trial judge, stating:
[Elvery judge will know when the trial of a misdemean-
or starts that no imprisonment may imposed, even though
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by
62. Junker, supra note 24, at 708-09. Because of the case-by-case approach employed
in applying this standard, it is questionable if this approach will not constitute a rever-
sion to the "special circumstances" rule in Betts v. Brady, leading to similar administra-
tion problems. Id. at 709.
63. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
64. Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1972).
65 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 49 (1972).
66. Id. at 48.
67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1962).
68. Id. at 349.
69. In Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1970), the Court stated, "A fine
may bear as heavily on an indigent accused as forced confinement. Th collateral conse-
quences of conviction may even be more serious .. " In Argersinger, Mr. Justice Poweli
cites the example of a conviction resulting in a suspension or revocation of the accused's
driver's license as being more serious than a short period of confinement. Argersinger v.
Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972).
70. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
NOTES
counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and grav-
ity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer
to represent the accused before the trial starts. 71
Criticism of the implementation of the Argersinger rule is based on
two lines of reasoning. First, it is suggested that the force of the
majority opinion will compel a judge to forego exercising his judi-
cial discretion in the sentencing stage by requiring him to decide
in advance of the trial whether or not the imprisonment option will
remain open. 72 A second related problem raises an equal protection
question. Under the rule enunciated by the Court, individual defend-
ants may be subjected to unfair and unequal treatment, depending
on whether a judge makes an arbitrary and discriminatory pre-trial
determination as to what sentence he will impose. 78
The third problem area involves the "magnitude" of the de-
cision. That is, whether there are sufficient resources available to
meet the demands of Argersinger.74 In 1965, it was estimated that
5,000,00075 persons are charged with misdemeanors each year, with
approximately 700,000 persons actually sentenced to imprisonment.76
Estimates as to how many of these misdemeanants are indigent
range from 25-50 per cent.7 1
Rejecting Justice Powell's assertion that the nation's legal re-
sources are insufficient to implement the requirements of Arger-
singer, the majority estimated that only 1,575-2,300 full-time attor-
neys would be required to represent all indigent misdemeanants.78
The "Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Crim-
inal Law" found:
71. Id. at 40.
72. Id. at 53. Mr. Justice Powell surmises that the practical effect will be that counsel
will be appointed in all but the most minor offenses where imprisonment would be to-
tally out of the question. 1d. at 55. Mr. Chief Justice Burger would rely on the "pre-
dictive evaluation" of the trial judge and the prosecutor. Id. at 42.
73. Id. at 54. Ironically enough, Mr. Justice Douglas lends support for this position in
his Douglas v. California opinion, where the Court held that a preliminary review of an
Indigent's appeal to determine if an attorney should be appointed, was violative of equal
protection as subjecting certain individuals to a prejudgment in the merits of their cases.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963).
74. See Junker, supra note 24, at 715-18. The author suggests that one possible reason
that the recognition of the right to counsel in the misdemeanor prosecution was so long
neglected was that "non-recognition of the indigent misdemeanant's right to counsel at
trial also serves to avert recognition of the misdemeanant's right to a pre-trial and post
conviction counsel." Id. at 717.
75. Goldberg, Help for the Indigent Accused: The Effect of Argersinger, 30 NLADA
BRIEFCASE, 203, 205 (July, 1972), places the figure at 8,000,000.
76. L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS 123 (1965) [hereinafter cited as L. SLVERSTmEIN].
77. Id. at 125.
78. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, n.7 (1972). Mr. Chief Justice Burger cited
a need for more defense attorneys and prosecutors in light of the decision. Id. at 42-43
(concurring). Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that law students may "provide an Im-
portant source of legal representation for the indigent." Id. at 40 (concurring).
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[T]he number of lawyers working full-time on the pros-
ecution and defense needed to satisfy the demand for law-
yers in felony and misdemeanor cases is 15,000-20,000...
[T]he lawyers manpower presently in the field meets less
than half the estimated need.7 9
A third report indicated a manpower requirement of 4,200-6,000 full-
time attorneys. 0 Only after the effects of Argersinger are analyzed
will there be any indication of how nearly our legal resources
measure up to the demands of our constitutional guarantees.
The fourth problem area relates to non-enforcement of existing
laws punishable as misdemeanors, and more specifically, the impact
of implementing Argersinger in rural areas.8 1 Due to the meager
financial resources of many small communities and the minimal
supply of lawyers in rural America, Justice Powell suggests that
a community could be forced to forego enforcement of its own
ordinances. 2 Another way out would be the decriminalization of
some offenses, and the elimination of incarceration for others. 8
It is evident that Argersinger is an imperfect decision. At best,
it leaves many questions unanswered, necessitating either:
1) Action by state legislatures and courts to eliminate the
problems presented by Argersinger, and to conform to the
requirements of the decision; or
2) Future guidance by the Supreme Court.84
The effect of Argersinger will vary from state to state, however,
the greatest impact of the decision will be on states that previously
lacked any requirement for providing counsel to the indignet ac-
cused.85  Now that the constitutional standard is set, what will
be the effect of Argersinger on North Dakota law? 86
79. 41 F.R.D. 389, 393-94 (1966).
80. Goldberg, supra note 75 at 205.
81. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 60-61 (1972).
82. Id. Wood, South Dakota, Is cited as an example.
83. Goldberg, supra note 75, at 204. Examples of offenses which could be decriminal-
Ized are: certain sexual practices, abortion, gambling, prostitution, and possession of
marijuana. Examples of offenses for which incarceration could be removed as a possible
penalty include: traffic offenses, public intoxication, prostitution, obscenity, and some
forms of disorderly conduct.
84. Mr. Justice Powell advocates the following three-pronged approach to determine
in what cases counsel should be afforded to an accused misdemeanant:
1) If the offense is one in which the state is represented by counsel and
most defendants who can afford the services of an attorney hire one, then
there is the presumption that the indigent also needs the assistance of coun-
sel ;
2) In conisidering the probable consequences of a conviction, as the serious-
ness of the consequences increase, so does the probability that an Indigent
should be represented by counsel.
3) Individual factors in each case should be considered.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 63-64 (1972).
85. Goldberg, supra note 75, at 205.
86. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 n.1 (1972), citing 3 CPMIGHTON L. REV.
103, 119-33 (1970), stated that at the time the decision was handed down, "[twelve
States provide[d] counsel for indigents accused of 'serious crime' in the misdemeanor
category. . . . Nineteen States provide[d] for the appointment of counsel In most mis-
demeanor cases."
NOTES
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA
The right to counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment" to the
other United States Constitution has been applied to trials in state
courts through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.88 Through case law, 9 statutory enactments"0 and constitu-
tional provisions,9'1 the State of North Dakota has made every effort
to guarantee this right.
In defining the rights of an accused, Section 13 of the North
Dakota Constitution refers to "criminal prosecution" and states that
in such prosecution "the party accused shall have the right . .. to
appeal and defend in person and with counsel. 912 Sections 27-08-31,9s
29-01-27," and 29-13-03 °5 of the North Dakota Century Code have
been referred to as "legislative expressions of the guarantee of one
accused of crime to appear in person and with counsel."9 6 The ef-
fectiveness of these statutes in maintaining a minimum standard
of the privilege of counsel depends largely on judicial interpretation.
The evolution of these basic laws culminated with the adoption
of S.B. No. 233 in 1967.97 This enactment imposed a limitation on
effective sentencing when violators of the state criminal law were
tried without the right to counsel. The earliest North Dakota refer-
ence to such a right and its proper implementation appears in
a statute passed by the thirteenth session of the Dakota Territory
Legislative Assembly held in Yankton in 1879. The statute states:
§ 1 COUNTY To EMPLOY COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DE-
FENDANT-That in all criminal cases triable in the Territory
of Dakota, where it is satisfactorily shown to the court that
87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 4.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, supra note 5.
89. See e.g., State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242, 247 (N.D. 1970) Stone v. State, 171
N.W.2d 119, 126 (N.D. 1969) ; Smith v. Woodley, 164 N.W.2d 594, 597 (N.D. 1969) ; John
v. State, 160 N.W.2d 37, 44 (N.D. 1968).
90. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-08-23 (1960), 27-08-24 (Supp. 1971), 27-08-31 (repealed
(1967), 29-01-27 (repealed 1967), 29-07-01.1 (Supp. 1971), 29-13-03 (1960). Chapter 27-08
deals generally with County Courts of Increased Juristlictions.
91. See N.D. CONST. §§ 13, 111. Section 13 deals with right to counsel while section
111 concerns powers and duties of County Courts.
92. N.D. CONST. § 13.
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08-31 (repealed 1967). "In all criminal cases in the county
court having increased Jurisdiction, when it is satisfactorily shown to the court that
the defendant has no means and is unable to employ counsel, the court shall assign
counsel for the defense .. "
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-27 (repealed 1967). "In all criminal actions when it Is
satisfactorily shown to the court that the defendant has no means and is unable to em-
Ploy counsel, the court shall appoint and assign counsel for his defense .... "
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-13-03 (1960). "If a defendant appears for arraignment with-
out counsel, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before
being arraigned and. must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires, and is
unable to employ counsel, the court must asnign counsel to defend him. Counsel so as-
signed shall serve without cost to the defendant .... "
96. State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599, 607 (N.D. 1954).
97. N.D. SEss. LAWS, ch. 259, § 3 (1967), codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 29-07-01.1 (Supp.
1971).
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the defendant has no means, and is unable to employ counsel,
the court shall in all such cases, where counsel is appointed
and assigned for defense, allow and direct to be paid by
the county in which such trial is had, a reasonable and just
compensation to the attorney or attorneys so assigned for
such services as they may render: Provided, however, that
such attorney or attorneys shall not be paid a sum to exceed
twenty-five dollars in any one case.""
In a historical sense this territorial measure changed very little
in the ninety years it existed. It was only in terms of monetary
reimbursement to the attorney that the most recent statute differed
from its predecessor. From an increase to "fifteen dollars per
day"99 in 1915, the amount was raised to the level of "twenty-five
dollars per day"'100 which lasted, until passage of the 1967 statute.
North Dakota Century Code section 27-08-31, which provided counsel
for indigents in county courts of increased jurisdiction, achieved
a similar type of transition from its inception until its eventual
replacement by section 29-07-01.1. The statute incurred several
changes from the beginning-when services were worth no more than
twenty-five dollars in any case' 0 1-to a figure that was "not to exceed
fifty dollars per case.' 0 2
The most precise change came with the creation of section
29-07-01.1 which superseded both sections 27-08-31 and 29-01-27.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS-PAYMENT
OF EXPENSES-The magistrate before whom a defendant
charged with the violation of state criminal law is brought
may appoint counsel from a list prepared under the direction
of the senior district judge in his district and in the manner
prescribed by him. The determination of the degree of need
of the defendant shall be deferred until his first appearance
before the trial judge, and the court may require the defend-
ant to answer all inquiries under oath concerning his need
for appointment of counsel. Thereafter, the court concerned
shall determine, with respect to each proceeding, whether
the defendant is a needy person. The appropriate judge may
appoint counsel for a needy person at any time or for any
proceeding arising out of a criminal case if reasonable.
Lawyers appointed to represent needy persons shall be
compensated at a reasonable rate to be determined by the
court. Expenses necessary for the adequate defense of a
98. N.D. SEsS. LAWS of 1879, ch. 7, § 1.
99. N.D. SEsS. LAWS of 1915, ch. 15, § 1.
100. N.D. SEss. LAWS of 1955, ch. 208, § 1, codified as N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-27
(1957 Supp.) (repealed 1967).
101. N.D. SESS. LAWS of 1895, ch. 43, § 20.
102. N.D. SESS. LAWS of 1955, ch. 199, § 1, codified as N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08-31
(1957 Supp.) (repealed 1967).
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needy person, when approved by the judge, shall be paid
by the county wherein the alleged offense took place. A de-
fendant with appointed counsel shall pay to the county such
sums as the court shall direct. The state's attorney shall seek
recovery of any such sums any time he determines the per-
son for whom counsel was appointed may have funds to repay
the county within six years of the date such amount was paid
on his behalf. 10 3
The adoption of this legislation did three things: it authorized
appointment of counsel for indigents at the preliminary hearing
stage, it deferred the determination of need until the initial ap-
pearance before the trial judge, and it required the defendant
to answer under oath inquiries concerning his request for counsel.
It was significant that the statute provided for court-appointed
counsel for indigents in "the court concerned" and before "the ap-
propriate judge." A 1970 North Dakota decision, State v. Heasley, ' 0 4
utilized this emphasis in determining the applicability of section
29-07-01.1 to county courts with increased jurisdiction as well as
district and county courts. 05
In Heasley the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor
that was punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more
than one year, or by a fine of not more than $500, or by both such
fine and imprisonment. 08 In addition, the defendant was required
to conduct his own defense in a jury trial. The trial court attempted
to appoint counsel for the defendant, but the attorney appointed
by the court refused to handle the defense. The court made no fur-
ther attempt to provide another attorney to represent the accused.
The lower court declared that since this was a misdemeanor case,
appointment of counsel was not mandatory:
103. (Emphasis added). The Forty-third Le-tslative Assembly of North Dakota indefi-
nitely postponed a bill which would have amended 29-07-01.1. The bill was designed to
give judges wider discretion in payments to court appointed counsel. In effect it would
have raised the fee paid to a standard set by the North Dakota Bar Association. The
reason for failure of the proposal was found in this portion of the new amendment:
* ' * and they shall be taxed (attorney's fees and expenses) against
the defendant as a judgment by the court which upon being deadlocked shall
constitute a lien upon the real estate of the defendant in like manner as ajudgment for money in a civil action.
This separately classified defendants with real property and those with personal property.
lC4. State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242 (N.D. 1970.).
105. The question of the right to counsel in municipal courts arose in North Dakota by
way of an inquiry to and subsequent opinion rendered by the Attorney General. See
[1968-1970] REP. Or ATT'Y GEN. OF NORTH DAKOTA. That opinion pointed out that under
section 29-07-01.1 of the North Dakota Century Code (Supp. 1971) an indigent defendant
charged with a violation of a state criminal law may have counsel appointed by the
court, the cost to be incurred by the county wherein the offense took place. The Attor-
ney General believed that the emphasis on " 'state criminal' as well as the provision that
expenses of court appointed counsel for Indigents shall be paid by the county wherein the
alleged offense took place" made it clear that such statute should not apply to municipal
ordinance violations.
Whether a municipal judge is required as a matter of law to appoint counsel in
such instance the Attorney General declared that section 29-07-01.1 as amended "is per-
missive rather than mandatory. Each situation must be determined on its own merits."
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This is a misdemeanor case in which the court appointment
of counsel is not mandatory; certainly, a defendant has a
right to be represented by counsel if he so chooses, but he
must first attempt to obtain counsel and if he, for one reason
or another . . . other than lack of funds . . . is unable to
obtain counsel, he is not entitled to have a court appointed
counsel.10 7
In a foresighted opinion Judge Knudson ruled, in line with
A rgersinger: 10 8
Under the provisions of Chapter 259 of the Session Laws of
1967, § 29-07-01.1 pocket supplement to the North Dakota
Century Code, the judge of the county court with increased
jurisdiction, or the judge of the district court, as the case
may be, must go forward to determine whether or not the
defendant is indigent and a needy person, and the judge
thereof, the appropriate judge, upon making a determination
that defendant is a needy person, must appoint counsel for
the defendant at public expense in any proceeding arising
out of a criminal case, whether the offense charged is a mis-
demeanor or a felony.1 09
106. The law defining 'misdemeanor' Is found In N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-01-07 and
states: "Crimes or public offenses are either felonies or misdemeanors. A felony Is a
crime which is or may be punishable with death or imprisonment in the penitentiary.
Every other crime is a misdemeanor. When a crime punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary also Is punishable by fine or imprisonment in a county jail, in the discretion
of the court or Jury, it is, except when otherwise specially declared by law to be a fel-
ony, a misdemeanor for all purposes after a Judgment imposing a punishment other than
imprisonment in the penitentiary."
The Forty-third Legislative Assembly In January of 1973 made massive revisions
of the criminal code and under N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-01-04(20) (Supp. 1973):
"misdemeanor" means an offense for which a term of Imprisonment of one
year or less is authorized by statute.
107. State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 246 (N.D. 1970). The lower court determined that
presence of counsel in this case was not requisite for going to trial. It further reasoned
that If defendant failed to show he was unable to retain counsel for purposes of an ap-
pointment and the fact that he was not charged with a felony allowed the court to pro-
ceed against the defendant without counsel. Id. at 46-47.
108. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 4017 U.S. 25 (1972).
109. State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242, 249 (N.D. 1970) (emphasis added).
The rule Heasley adopts follows substantially the recommendations
of a report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. The Commis-
sion recommends the following (p. 150):
The objective to be met as quickly as possible is to provide
counsel to every defendant who faces a significant penalty, if
he cannot afford to provide counsel himself. This should apply
to cases classified as misdemeanors as well as those classified
as felonies. Counsel should be provided early In the proceed-
ings and certainly no later than the first judicial appearance.
The service of counsel should be available after conviction
through appeal, and in collateral attack proceedings when the
issues are not frivolous. The ;immediate minimum, until it
becomes possible to provide the foregoing, is that all criminal
defendants who are in danger of substantial loss of liberty shall
be provided with counsel.
The American Bar Association's project on minimum standards for criminal justice
in its Approved Draft, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRov~miNo DEFENSE SERVICES (1968), pro-"
poses the following as a minimum standard:
NOTES
Before the defendant is asked whether he desires or is in need
of counsel he must be informed of all his rights."10 It is meaningless
to ask a person about his desire for assistance by counsel when
he is unaware of his right to have representation at public expense.""
Heasley summarizes concisely the duties of a trial judge when con-
fronted with an indigent in need of counsel. He should:
(1) inform the accused of his right to counsel and of an
indigent defendant's right to a court-appointed counsel at
public expense; (2) ask the accused if he desires aid of coun-
sel; (3) if the accused desires counsel, inquire into his finan-
cial condition; and (4) if the accused is financially unable
to employ counsel of his own choice, appoint competent coun-
sel to represent him at the expense of the county.112
The key element espoused by the Heasley opinion was that
the court had the duty to determine the need of the defendant." 8
The accused in North Dakota is not required to begin such proceed-
ings; the court must initiate the proper inquiry and have the defend-
ant file a statement of indigency." 4
The decision illustrates that North Dakota has precisely defined
the duties of district and county courts in pre-trial proceedings.
Unless a person intelligently and understandingly waives his rights"15
he must be afforded the right to counsel."16
In addition to the constitutional requirement of appointment of
counsel, sections 29-07-01 and 29-07-01.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code require that a magistrate appoint counsel for a defendant
charged with the violation of a "state criminal law." The Attorney
General has stated that, "if the legislature had intended to limit
Counsel should be provided In all criminal proceedings for of-
fenses punishable by loss of liberty, except those types of of-
fenses for which such punishment Is not likely to be imposed,
regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors or
otherwise. Id. at § 4.
110. See N.D. CENT. CoDE 29-07-01.1 (Supp. 1971). The duty resting upon the trial court
to properly advise a defendant in criminal actions concerning his constitutional and statu-
tory rights has been considered by North Dakota Courts prior to State v. Heasley. See,
e.g., State v. Hefta, 88 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1958); State v. 'Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599
(N.D. 1954) ; State v. Malnourie, 67 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1954) ; State v. Magrum, 38 N.W.2d
358 (N.D. 1949) ; Mazakahomni v. State, 25 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1947).
111. State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242, 250 (N.D. 1970).
112. Id.
113. The court disregards an argument by the prosecution that defendant must make a
showing of indigency or being a needy person to be eligible for court appointed counsel
at County expense. Id.
114. See appendix for examples of indigency forms used In North Dakota.
115. See, e.g., State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242 (N.D. 1970) ; Stone v. State, 171 N.W.2d
119, 126 (N.D. 1969); State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857, 861-62 (N.D. 1962); State v.
Hefta, 88 N.W.2d 626, 631 (N.D. 1958); State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599, 611 (ND.
1954,) ; State v. Magrum, 38 N.W.2d 358, 361 (N.D. 1949).
116. There are no provisions in North Dakota law to pay for the expenses of prepara-
tion and investigation, however, the court has power to subpoena and order the county
to pay fees for witnesses for indigent defendants. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-19 (Supp.
1971).
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the appointments to felony cases, it could easily have used the
term 'felony' instead of the broad term 'criminal cases'.' 117 Almost
without question misdemeanors are considered within the sphere
of the criminal law." 8 In light of Heasley and the Attorney General's
interpretation of the statutory framework, it is safe to conclude
that North Dakota law already conforms with the Argersinger stand-
ards.
III. THE REGIONAL PUBLIC DEFENDER EXPERIMENT IN
NORTH DAKOTA119
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the right to counsel in criminal cases has now been
extended to indigent defendants, there has been much disagreement
as to how the courts should meet this requirement. The Supreme
Court provided little direction in Argersinger, declaring that it did
"not sit as an ombudsman to direct state courts how to manage
their affairs but only to make clear the federal constitutional re-
quirements."'120
Historically, a judge simply assigned an attorney to represent
an indigent on an ad hoc basis. This is generally referred to
as the "assigned counsel system" and in most cases operates en-
tirely through the county judge. The system is "simple in its concept
and basic operation."'121 If a defendant appears in court during a
criminal prosecution without a lawyer and it is learned he cannot
afford one, the judge appoints one for him. Appointments are made
from attorneys in private practice on a case by case basis. The
lawyer who is assigned is expected to represent the client with the
same enthusiasm as if he had been retained. 122
117. r1966-19681 REP. OF ATT'Y. GEN. OF NORTH DAKOTA Nov. 15, 1967 at 61.
118. Various opinions in other jurisdiction- have ruled prior to Argersinger v. Hamlin
that such a right to the assistance of counsel must be appointed in misdemeanor cases
to defendants who are judged indigent. See. e.J.Tames v. Heasley, 410 F.2d 325, 333 (5th
Cir. 1969) : Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Va. 1971) ; Arbo v. Hegstrom,
261 F. Supp. 397, 400 (D. Conn. 1966) : Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490, P.2d 910,
915 (Alaska 1971); Rodrio'uez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216, 219 (1971);
Wrigrt v. Denato, 178 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa, 1971) : State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 180
S.E.2d 74, 83 (W.Va. 1971) : Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 458 P.2d 414, 417 (1969) ;
n re Smiley, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179, 184 (1967); State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388,
154 N.W.2d 888, 895 (1967).
119. While all defender systems share the same conceptual basis (a salaried attorney
providing the indigent accused with defense on a regular basis) there exist numerous
variations of applying the concept. Defender systems may vary according to their funding
(private, public, or public-private mix), the kinds of cases they handle (misdemeanors,
felonies, juveniles, appellate actions) and as to the territory of the jurisdiction (munici-
pal, county, regional, statewide). See generally L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 76, at 39-61.
120. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972).
121. 1 L. SrLvEnmiN, aupra note 76, at 15.
122. The reader's attention to the operation of the assigned system in North Dakota
is directed to a study of the Burleigh County, North Dakota Bar Association, Providing
Counsel for the Indigent Accused, A Regional Study (January 1, 1970). It id notable that
the study recommends the adoption of a form of public defender system within North
Dakota.
NoTEs
This system has caused numerous problems. Appointment of
counsel often occurs so late in the proceedings that the defendant
lacks the advice of an attorney at the most critical stage of litigation.
Often counsel is unable to properly investigate the case prior to
entering a plea. 23 The method of selecting a private attorney is
in many cases unfair to both the attorney and the defendant.
Courts often excuse a number of attorneys for various private
conflict reasons, thus placing the burden on the younger and less
experienced members of the bar. 2 4 Appointed counsel are not usually
reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenditures and in most cases
are forced to act as their own investigators.12 5 Since they are often
young attorneys or others who lack experience in criminal law,
failing preparation and investigation often places them at the mercy
of the prosecuting attorney.126 In most cases if the client is convicted,
the assigned counsel's duties end with the sentencing. This leaves
the defendant who desires to file an appeal on his own. 12 7
Because of such difficulties, several states have looked for alter-
natives that will fulfill the constitutional requirement. 28 In search
of a solution, North Dakota has experimented with the concept
of a regional public defender.12
9
B. METHODOLOGY
The experimental defender project currently in operation in
a ten-county region in the state of North Dakota involves the counties
of Burleigh, Morton, Emmons, Kidder, Sheridan, McLean, Sioux,
Grant, Oliver, and Mercer.130 The material presented in this section
was compiled through visits to the Public Defender Office in Bis-
Actual experience is the most convincing test of the desirability and the
feasibility of a public defender system. The committee believes the public
defender should be put to the test.
Id. at 38.1.
123. See, e.g., Note, The New Jersey Public Defender, 5 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoB. 153,
154 (1969) ; Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal Dis-
tricts Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 588 (1963).
124. 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 76, at 32.
125. See, e.g., Simeone, The Missouri Public Defender Bill, 13 S'r. Louis U.L.J. 284,
285 (1969); Comment, Implementing Justice: National Public Defenders Project, 1 VAL.
U.L. REV. 320, 321 (1967) ; 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 76, at 29, 32.
126. See, e.g., Note, Implementing the Right to Counsel in New Jersey-A Proposed De-
fender System, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 789, 809-10 (1966). See generally 1 L. SILVERSrEIN,
supra note 76, at 20.
127. See, e.g., Note, The New Jersey Public Defender, 5 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 153
(1969) ; 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 139-141.
128. See generally L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN THE
AMERIcAN COURTS (1965).
129. See Appendix I for states that have implemented a full time public defender sya-
tem.
130. The Public Defender serves as counsel for indigent defendants in all actions ex-
cept for those concerning municipal and federal cases.
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marck, personal interviews with the Defender and his staff and
statistical analysis of cases handled by that office."8'
C. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
1. Inception and Organization
The Regional Public Defender Office was established in April,
1971, under a grant from the North Dakota Combined Law Enforce-
ment Counsel. 13 2 The project's purpose was
to amass experience and statistics in the area of the defense
of the criminal indigent and to establish a model alternative
to the present system of randomly appointed defense coun-
sel.38
The Bismarck Defender hoped that at the project's inception each
county in the region would be willing to contract to bear a certain
fixed percentage of the total grant, based on the average criminal
activity in their respective counties over a five-year period.'13 It
was anticipated that
. . . the consolidation of defense cases should permit econ-
mies of experience, uniformity and scale . . . [and] that
the counties will be willing to enter into a cooperative joint
contract as a hedge against widely varying and unpredictable
expenditures for appointed counsel.'35
This plan was rejected by several of the smaller counties, which
necessitated billing each county for services actually rendered on
a case by case basis. Subsequent developments have shown that
the original plan would have been more effective. 86
The grant is projected for a three year period subject to annual
review and funding. The original $30,000 budget was increased during
the second year to $48,000 and an assistant Public Defender was
added.1"'
131. Much of the factual information contained in this section was gained from the
interviews and records provided by Kent Higgins, Public Defender. We wish to acknow-
ledge and thank Mr. Higgins for his assistance.
132. LEAA Grant number A-0117. Burleigh and Morton Counties contributed 40 per
cent of the funds for establishment of the Public Defender with federal funds accounting
for 60 per cent.
133. Id. at 4.
134. See Appendix II.
135. LEAA Grant number A-0117 at 6.
136. An Illusfration is Kidder County. After three years of negligible expenses It in-
curred a bill of over $2500 relative to a murder which never reached trial. 'Under the
contract theory, Kidder would have been assessed $600 per year for defense services.
187. See Appendix III for comparative budgets.
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The project is to be supervised by the Judges of the Third,
Fourth, and Sixth Judicial Districts and Judges of the County Courts
of Increased Jurisdiction of Burleigh and Morton Counties. It should
be noted that it is entirerly within the discretion of the presiding
judge to determine whether the Public Defender should be ap-
pointed.188
2. Operations
The Public Defender is usually appointed to a case only after
the defendant has made his initial appearance in court. At this time,
the accused is informed of the charges against him, advised of his
right to counsel and the availability of a court appointed attorney
at public expense after a determination of indigency.139 The vast
majority of clients are contacted while in jail and only in rare in-
stances does an individual approach the Office of the Public Defender
prior to his arrest.
Since the Regional Defender's Office is composed of only two
attorneys, the procedure for assigning cases presents little difficulty.
Each of the two lawyers are assigned cases as they come to
the attention of the Office of the Defender with relatively little for-
mality. The self-imposed requirements are that: (1) an effort is
made to maintain approximate equality in their respective case loads;
(2) each attorney handles clients whom he has represented in
the past; and (3) the Assistant Public Defender assumes the res-
ponsibility for cases arising at the State Penitentiary.
A file is established in the Defender Office at the time the
Public Defender is appointed by the court to represent an accused.
Both the Public Defender and his Assistant are responsible for
establishing a file on each case they are assigned. When the client
is interviewed, he completes an extensive personal information form
and gives a taped oral statement to the Defender which is later
transcribed and placed in the client's file.
When the Defender is contacted, the first action taken is to
assign a file number and place a small notecard with the client's
name and number upon the office status board. The system pro-
vides easy reference to the status of every 'live' case being handled.
Through the use of colored pins the attorney is able to indicate
the type of offense (felony, misdemeanor) and the whereabouts
of the client (jail, penitentiary or released). The card remains
on the board until the case is finished and a billing is sent out.
138. As an example the Juvenile Commissioner of Burleigh County refuses to utilize
the Public Defender in any actions in his court.
139. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. See also Appendix IV for an example.of
an indigency form.
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Upon the conclusion of a proceeding by a plea of guilty, dismissal,
or an acquittal, the file is closed. If sufficient grounds exist the
case will remain open pending the outcome of an appeal.
The Public Defender receives a salary of $15,000 (which is an
increase of $1,000 over the salary in the first year of the operation)
while his assistant is paid $14,000. The positions are regarded as
full-time employment and for this reason the attorneys who fill
these positions are not permitted to engage in private practice,
either civil or criminal. Both counsel currently employed are in
their early 30's and have less than five years of experience.
The Public Defender Office employs the services of a private
investigator retained on a monthly salary of $150.00, calculated
on the basis of 30 hours of investigatory time. Because the Defender
has neither the budget nor the case load to afford or warrant the
employment of its own exclusive investigator, one is shared with
four private law firms.
D. Statistics
The counties involved in the regional program cover an area
of 14,195 square miles, encompassing parts of three judicial districts.
The distance by highway from Bismarck to all the county seats
is no greater than 77 miles and on the average is approximately
50 miles. 14 0
Appendix VI analyzes cases handled during the first year in
the respective counties according to the type of action and their
disposition. During this period 204 cases were processed through
the Bismarck office and a corresponding amount are expected for
the current year. As is to be expected, the greatest number of
cases originate in the population centers within the region. Burleigh
County accounts for 53 per cent of the activity while Burleigh and
Morton counties together contribute 74 per cent of the total.
While it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of one system
in comparison to another, the five indices appearing in Appendix VII
offer a basis for a cursory evaluation.14, The number of dismissals
in proportion to the total dispositions is indicative of the effect of
the presence of counsel at early stages in a criminal prosecution.4 2
The North Dakota Regional Defender procures a significantly higher
140. See Appendix V.
141. Benjaxnin and Pedeliske, The Minnesota Public Defender System and the Criminal
Law Process, A Comparative Study of Behavior at 'the Judicial District Level, 4 LAW &
Soc'y Rxv. 279, 291-93 (1969); Note, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel
and Public Defender Systems, 49 N.C.L. Rrv. 705, 714 (1971).
142. Note, 49 N.C.L. REv., supra note 141, at 714.
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percentage of dismissals than the assigned or public defender sys-
tems in either of the two comparison states.'43
A high- proportion of guilty pleas to total dispositions seem to
imply a lack of adequate defense.," However, it might also indicate
a satisfactory plea bargain change that fluctuates with the type
of offense. Here also the North Dakota study compares favorably,
especially in the defense of misdemeanants.' 5
The proportion of cases going to trial connotes a willingness
on the part of the defense attorney to challenge the state to prove
its case.14 6 The wide variance between the percentage of cases
going to trial in the felony and misdemeanor categories tends to
show that the pressure to reach a pre-trial settlement increases
with gravity of the offense. As Silverstien notes, a high percentage
of cases tried does not necessarily indicate the most effective
defense.
In order to gain trial experience young lawyers who
serve as assigned counsel are more likely to advise their
clients to plead not guilty than are retained counsel. 147
From a defense attorney's perspective, probation or a sus-
pended sentence is more favorable than incarceration. A plausible
explanation for the high figures of the North Dakota Public Defender
might be his ability to successfully negotiate with the county pros-
ecutors for reduced sentences.'4
A high percentage of acquittals reflects upon the attorney's
evaluation of the case in its initial stages as well as his ability
in the courtroom. The acquittal ratio in the State Regional Program
was generally lower than in the other sample states. 49 In most
instances after extensive plea bargaining between the Public De-
fender and the State's Attorney, the cases actually going to trial
are those weighing heavily in favor of one of the parties. A sure
case lessens the spirit to compromise, and this explains the lower
figure.
In three of the five categories, the Bismarck Defender's Office
was superior to the assigned system in the two comparison states. 50
In the other two indices neither system demonstrated a marked
143. See Appendix VII.
144. 49 N.C.L. REV., Note supra note 141 at 714.
145. See Appendix VII.
146. 49 N.C.L. REv., supra note 141 at 714.
147. 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 76, at 25.
148. See Appendix VII.
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superiority.15 While it would be impossible to assign relative values
to each index, the performance of the Regional Public Defender
Program in the areas tested appeared to be more effective. 152
A cost analysis is presented in Appendices VIII-XI. Appendix
VIII consists of a cost breakdown for the Public Defender's Office
as well as each county within the region. A comparison is made
with the expenses incurred by Grand Forks" in providing represen-
tation through the assigned counsel system. Appendix IX shows
the volume of cases and types of actions in which counsel was
appointed. 5 4 Appendices X and XI represent a cost study which
may be validly compared to figures drawn from the Burleigh County
program. Eight of the counties within the Public Defender Region
recorded an average per capita cost less than that expended in
Grand Forks County. 155 It is notable that the average per capita
cost for the ten county area was half that of the assigned system
operating in Grand Forks. An equally telling statistic relates to
the average cost per offense. The expenditures in Grand Forks
county for 1971 and 1972 are significantly higher than those within
the Defender Region. Based on this data the Public Defender system
seems much more economical to operate than the assigned counsel
program.
IV. CONCLUSION
The statistics presented in this note, although certainly not
exhaustive, do reflect favorably on the overall effectiveness and
the relatively low cost of the Public Defender program. Such results
justify continued evaluation and consideration. The Defender System
provides a feasible alternative to the assigned counsel system and
has in its short existence in North Dakota proved to be a realistic
means of providing legal services to indigents.
Several further observations can be made about the mechanics
to be considered in the implementation of either a statewide or
regional defender program. In light of Argersinger, and the high
volume of misdemeanor cases tried in municipal courts, extension
of the Public Defender Program to municipal cases might be merit-
ed. Also, due to the wide distribution of North Dakota's small popu-
lation, any state wide defender program would have to be admin-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Figures from Grand Forks made available through the courtesy of Judge Kirk
Smith of the County Court of Increased Jurisdiction.
154. Due to the unavailability of statistics from the District Court It was impossible
to make a disposition analysis.
155. Sioux County had no costs as it did not require the services of the Public De-
fender. The cost in Grant County may be explained by an unusually high felony rate
for the year.
NOTES
istered on a regional basis. As in the Bismarck experiment, the
Defender should operate out of a major city and function as a circuit
rider in the surrounding counties.
If the state elects to establish the public defender system,
the costs presently-borne by the federal grant would have to be
assumed by the state or local governments. Although an exact
dollar amount for such an extension is not presently determinable,
the effect would be to increase the expense of the program as
measured by per capita costs and average costs per offense at
the existing regional office. However, even with such an increase
it is anticipated that the Public Defender program would still com-
pare favorably with the assigned counsel system.
North Dakota's Forty-Third Legislative Assembly considered a
bill (H.B. 1038) which would have established a statewide public
defender system. This proposal was indefinitely postponed by the
North Dakota House Judiciary Committee. The principle reason
was a lack of statistical research and emperical data. It is hoped
that this note will fill part of that void.
ROBERT J. ERIcKSON
JAMES S. HILL
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APPENDIX I
PUBLIC DEFENDERS-STATE-WIDE BASIS
State Population (1970)* Program Cost* Cost per Capita
Alaska 302,000 $500,000 $1.65
Colorado 2,207,000 $1,273,000 $ .57
Delaware 548,000 $219,000 $ .39
District of Columbia 757,000 $1,210,000 $1.59
Florida 6,789,000 $2,399,000 $ .35
Hawaii 770,000 $68,000 $ .08
Maryland 3,922,000 N/A N/A
Massachusetts 5,689,000 $1,130,000 $ .19
Minnesota 3,805,000 $209,000 $ .05
Nevada 489,000 $470,000 $ .96
New Jersey 7,168,000 $5,370,000 $ .75
Oregon 2,091,000 $283,000 $ .13
Rhode Island 950,000 $145,000 $ .1
Wisconsin 4,418,000 $61,000 $ .01
*Figures rounded off to nearest thousand
Statistics are based on a nation-wide survey of Public Defender Systems prepared
by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Assistance Program. (1972).
NOTES
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APPENDIX III
ITEMIZED 'BUDGET FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
1971-72 1972-73
Applicant's Federal Applicant's Federal








Mileage, 10,000 Miles at 10c per mile
Out-of-State
Per Diem, at $15.00 per day





Equipment Purchases, IBM, Dictation
Equipment & Type.
'Rent, Office and Parking Space
Furniture Purchases
Telephone and Answering Service




























GRAND TOTAL of Categories A, B, C
-724
1, 12,000 18,000 12,000 36,000
NOTES
APPENDIX IV
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA )
COUNTY OF GRAND FORKS )











The above-named Defendant, being first duly sworn, deposes and makes un-
der oath the following statement regarding his personal and financial circum-
stances:
1. Name of Charge: Date of Arrest:
2. Marital Status:
a. Single----Married -Separated- Divorced- .
b. Number of dependent children .
c. Other dependents-----.





Name of employer Employer's Phone
Address of employer
Nature of employment
What is DIfendant's job?
How long has Defendant been employed by present employee?
5. Finances:
Income $ per month or $ per week.
Cash on hand $ Cash in bank $
Dated at
Of
, North Dakota this day
19-
Defendant's signature




Original--Clerk of District Court
Copy-Defendant
Copy-Magistrate
DC Form "A" 1M 0970




Square Population County Population of BIwy.-Co. Seat Judicial
County Miles * Seat County Seat to Bismarck" District
Burleigh 1,649 40,714 Bismarck 34,703 - 4th
Emmons 1,546 7,200 Linton 1,695 64 3rd
Kidder 1,377 4,362 Steee 696 41 4th
Sheridan 995 3,232 McClusky 664 63 4th
McLean 2,090 11,251 Washburn 804 39 4th
Morton 1,933 20,310 Mandan 11,093 6 6th
Sioux 1,124 3,632 Fort Yates 1,153 77 6th
Grant 1,664 5,009 Carson 466 64 6th
Oliver 720 2,322 Center 619 40 6th
Mercer 1,097 6,175 Stanton 517 64 6th
TOTALS 14,195 104,207 52,410
*Latest census figures (1970)
**Average Distance from County Seats to Bismarck-50.55 miles
NOTES 7j
APPENDIX VI
CASELOAD BREAKDOWN FOR THE YEAR BEGINNING APRIL 1, 1971 TO
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COST ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 1971 TO MARCH 31, 1972
729
Number of Total Cost Average Cost Average Cost
County Unbillable Offenses Billed Per Capita Per Offense
McLean - 13 $ 683.39 $.07 $ 52.56
Sheridan - 1 $ 139.26 $.04 $139.26
Mercer - 6 $. 259.72 $.04 $ 43.29
Emmons - 1 $ 264.41 $.04 $264.41
Oliver - 2 $ 135.49 $.06 $ 67.75
Kidder 2 11 $ 388.36 $.09 $ 35.31
Grant - 15 $1,750.33 $.35 $116.68
Morton 10 55 $3,494.60 $.16 $ 63.54
Burleigh 7 119 $9,318.29 $.23 $ 78.31
Sioux - - - -
Other 16 - - -
35 223 $16,433.85* $.12 $ 73.69
COST ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BASED ON THE TOTAL ANNUAL GRANT FUNDING
Grant Average Cost Average Cost
Allocation Per Capita Per Offense
April 1, 1971-March 31, 1972 $30,000 $.29 $134.53
April 1, 1972--March 1, 1973 $48,000 $.45 $215.25t
*Figure indicates amount bill for cases commenced within one year period,
therefore amount over $12,000 represents billings on cases completed during
second year.
tBased on an estimate of the same number of offenses as during the first year
of operation.
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APPENDIX IX
GRAND FORKS COUNTY COURT OF INCREASED JURISDICTION




1. Bound over to District Court 59
2. Dismissed 10
3. Incarcerated 1





























COUNTY LEGAL FEES PAID FOR SERVICES BY COURT
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APPENDIX XI
GRAND FORKS COUNTY LEGAL FEES PAID TO ASSIGNED
COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE OF THE INDIGENT ACCUSED







*Includes expense of appointments for
jurisdiction, and juvenile court.
district court, county court of increase
tBased on appointments made in the county court increased jurisdiction, for cases
heard in that court or bound over to district court only. For this reason the
expenditure for assigned counsel in juvenile court has been deducted.
Year
(1970)
(1971)
(1972)
Average
Cost
$137.15
$220.88
